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Labor Economics I >> Content Detail



Recitations



Recitations

The following recitation notes are courtesy of Konrad Menzel and used with permission.


REC #TOPICSCONTENTS
I. Labor Market Statistics: Data Sources and Historical Overview
II. The Neoclassical Labor Supply Model
1Measurement Error (PDF)

Deriving the Slutsky Equation


Using Roy's Identity



Measurement Error


Notation

Classical Measurement Error

Group Means as Proxy Variables

Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data

Cures for Classical Measurement Error

"Non-Classical" Measurement Error

2Maximum Likelihood (PDF)

Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)




MLE Examples


Bernoulli Distribution

Normal Linear Regression



The Probit Model


3Panel Data (PDF)

Estimation With Panel Data


Basic Setup

First Differences

Fixed Effects

Random Effects



Measurement Issues


Non-Classical EIV: Division Bias

Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data

One Solution to EIV: Wald IV

III. Labor Demand, Immigration, Minimum Wages, and Unions
4Instrumental Variables (PDF)

Grouped Data and Instrumental Variables


How Does OLS Work?

Group Means as Proxy Variables

Main Types of Bias in OLS

Grouped-Data IV

Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)

2SLS as a Grouped Data IV

Potential Problems: Weak Instruments, Many Instruments



Discussion of the Replication of Angrist


OLS Regressions

Fixed-Effects Regressions

2SLS Estimates

The Card Critique

5Instrumental Variables (cont.) (PDF)

Instrumental Variables (continued)


Omitted Variables and the Wald Estimator

2SLS as a Grouped Data IV

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

A Few Hints About Calculations With Scalars in Stata

6Random Coefficient Models (PDF)

Random Coefficient Models


Motivation

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Example: General Exam 2003, Question 1

IV. Human Capital, Education, and Training
7Educational Choice (PDF)

Educational Choice


The Discount Rate Bias Story

A Simple Model for Signaling

Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium in Signaling Games

Separating Equilibrium

Pooling Equilibrium

8Bargaining and Hold-Up (PDF)

Motivation




Bargaining


The Strategic Approach

The Axiomatic Approach

Interlude: Efficient Bargaining With Inefficient Outcomes?



The Hold-Up Problem - Investment in Physical Capital


V. Labor Demand and Related Topics
9Labor Demand (PDF)

Market Power and "Classical" Labor Demand




Estimating Market Power


The Conduct Parameter

The Corts Critique

VI. Turnover, Matching, Learning, and the Returns to Tenure
10Normal Learning Model (PDF)

Statistical Learning


The Normal Learning Model

The Jovanovic Example



The Holmström (1982) Career Concerns Model


11Models of Turnover (PDF)

Models of Turnover and Their Empirical Predictions


Motivation



Matching and On-The-Job Search - Deconstructing Jovanovic II


Dynamic Decisions, Convexity, and Option Values

Option Values in Continuous Time


 








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